Law, Finance and Development: Further Analyses of Longitudinal Data by Sarkar, Prabirjit & Singh, Ajit
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Law, Finance and Development: Further
Analyses of Longitudinal Data
Prabirjit Sarkar and Ajit Singh
Centre for Business Research, Cambridge University, UK
June 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39060/
MPRA Paper No. 39060, posted 27. May 2012 14:36 UTC
 LAW, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
FURTHER ANALYSES OF LONGITUDINAL DATA 
 
 
 
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge 
Working Paper No. 387 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Prabirjit Sarkar 
Economics Department 
Jadavpur University, Kolkata-700032, India; and 
University of Cambridge 
Centre for Business Research 
Judge Business School Building 
Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1AG 
email: prabirjitsarkar@gmail.com 
 
and 
 
Ajit Singh 
Director of Research 
Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance, CERF, Judge Business School, 
University of Cambridge 
Chair in Economics, University of Birmingham Business School 
Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Cambridge 
Life Fellow, Queens' College, Cambridge, CB3 9ET, U.K. 
Tel:  +44 1223 350434; Fax: +44 1223 740479 
email: as14@cam.ac.uk 
 
 
June 2009 
 
 
 
This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance. 
 Abstract 
This paper analyses a longitudinal dataset on legal protection of shareholders 
over a 36 year period, 1970-2005 for four advanced countries, UK, France, 
Germany and the US.  It examines two aspects of the legal origin hypothesis - 
whether shareholder protection is higher in the common law countries (UK and 
USA) than in the civil law countries (France and Germany) and whether 
shareholder protection matters for stock market development in the short and 
long runs. It also examines the ‘causation’ issue and the ‘endogeneity’ problem- 
whether greater shareholder protection leads to stock market development or 
whether stock market development leads to changes in law.  
 
The paper casts serious doubt on the validity of the basic theses of the Anglo 
Saxon legal and developmental model.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper reports on the work of an interdisciplinary research project on law, 
finance and development being carried out at the Centre for Business Research 
(CBR), University of Cambridge. The project involves both economists and 
lawyers. It has prepared new longitudinal data sets on legal protection of 
shareholders as well as on creditors’ rights and labour rights over a 36 year 
period, 1970-2005 for four OECD countries (UK, France, Germany and the US) 
and India. Such time-series information has hitherto not been available. The 
first results from the analysis of the time-series data on shareholder protection 
for four OECD countries are reported in Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2008).1 
The present paper complements that article by further statistical and 
econometric analysis of the assembled data. Specifically, the paper presents two 
kinds of additional analysis:  
 
 It has made a full examination of the ‘causation’ issue and the 
‘endogeneity’ problem. The central question here is whether legal 
changes such as, for example, greater shareholder protection lead to stock 
market development or whether stock market development leads to 
changes in law. Granger causality tests have been employed to shed light 
on this issue. 
 
 The co-integration analysis used in Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2008) 
has been taken a step further by distinguishing between short-term 
changes arising from observed relationships between economic time-
series and their long-term relationships.  
 
 In addition to this fuller econometric analysis of the data the paper 
introduces and analyses time-series data on three new indicators of stock 
market development. 
 
The starting point for our research is the pioneering and seminal work on the 
relationships between law, finance and development by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) (see for example LLSV 1997; 1998). 2 
LLSV’s work, which has dominated leading journals in economics and finance 
during the last ten years, represents an ambitious body of research that has tried 
to link together law, institutional economics and the general literature on the 
determinants of economic growth. LLSV pride themselves on the wide range of 
their empirical results and how these taken together can only be explained in 
terms of a theory of legal origin that they propose.  
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Although the Cambridge longitudinal data is available only for four countries, 
these are the critical countries in relation to the literature on law, finance and 
development. In the LLSV theory of legal origin, the three countries, England, 
France and Germany, may be termed as ‘mother countries’. These are 
essentially countries where different legal systems originated, and subsequently 
spread to developing countries often through colonisation and conquest.  In the 
US, not a mother country, the Anglo-Saxon system nevertheless reached a high 
level of development and the model was exported to other countries.  Two main 
empirical questions are explored in this paper: 
  
 What is the nature of the relationship between legal protection to 
shareholders and legal origin of countries? 
 Does better shareholder protection lead to faster development of the 
financial sector and particularly of stock markets? 
 
The next section will provide the intellectual background and the motivation for 
these questions. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 3 will discuss the 
variables used in our longitudinal data set and how these relate to the variables 
used by LLSV in their mainly cross-sectional studies. Sections 4 and 5 outline 
the results of the empirical analysis and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Motivations for Empirical Questions: Theoretical Background 
 
In studying the relationship between law, finance and development, the 
following issues immediately come to the fore: 
 
 How does law affect economic development? 
 How does one explain inter-country differences in legal rules, particularly 
in relation to corporate finance, corporate bankruptcy and minority 
shareholder rights. 
 Are some countries’ legal rules better than others from the perspective of 
economic development? 
 
LLSV’s important claim is that these legal differences between countries can be 
categorized, quantified and analysed.  Their efforts lead to results showing that 
countries belonging to the ‘common-law family’ [UK and other countries] have 
higher protection for shareholders and greater rights for creditors than do 
countries belonging to the ‘civil law’ legal family [France and other countries].  
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The legal systems not only differ with respect to protection for shareholders, but 
also with respect to labour, contract enforcement and self-dealing rules, among 
other attributes (see further La Porta et al, 2008; Djankov et al, 2008, 2003; 
Botero et al 2004). However, in this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with 
the question of protection for shareholders and its implications for corporate 
finance and economic development. LLSV argue that common law works better 
than civil law and is more conducive to economic development, because3: 
 
 Judges interpret the law in common law countries whereas in civil law 
countries judges are bound by long explicit laws and codes leaving them 
with little discretion.  
 This evolution of the difference between the two systems (common law 
and civil law system) has occurred over the last 300 years and has 
continued to affect development of laws to the present day.  In other 
words, they assume very strong path dependence.  
 
The policy implications of this analysis are far reaching.  Essentially LLSV 
argue that the Anglo-Saxon model based on English common law is most 
conducive to the protection of shareholders – more broadly, to safeguarding 
property rights, and freedom of contracts.  As a consequence, common law 
country firms have greater access to outside finance, are less subject to 
government control, have faster corporate growth.  These characteristics in turn 
generate faster growth of national GDP.4 
 
On that basis LLSV and their adherents suggest that the Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate law represents the end of history as there is wide consensus that main 
corporate goal should be shareholders’ wealth maximization subject to 
constraints of liquid stock markets (Hansman and Kraakman 2001).  LLSV’s 
work also connects up with that of the development economists who suggest 
that the ultimate determinant of economic development is institutions.  Legal 
institutions clearly play a significant role, but LLSV analysis suggests that their 
role is crucial (Rodrik 2002). 
 
The LLSV assertions are very much disputed by the modern scholars of 
corporate law.  For example, under current French practice judges interpret the 
law whereas English judges on the other hand have less scope than before in 
view of the detailed descriptions contained in modern English law, such as the 
company law (Deakin & Singh 2008).  The French judges are also able to have 
discretions by appealing to the Roman law concept of ‘good faith’.  The French 
Government has protested about LLSV’s work, as critics suggest that their 
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perceptions are based on the outdated comparative legal scholarship of the 
1960s. 
 
However from a Third World perspective, it would seem arguable that it is not 
law which determines economic development, but rather politics that 
determines both law and development.  The last point may be illustrated readily 
by considering the case of India – a common law country par excellence.  Soon 
after independence in 1947 the Indian government decided to have a socialist 
pattern of society.  This required government ownership of the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the economy as well as a massive regulation of the private sector.  
Such a development model held sway between 1950 and 1980 and its 
implementation was certainly not hampered by the common law legal system.  
In 1980 the government changed policy and decided to do the opposite, i.e. 
privatize, deregulate.  This again was not hampered by the common law legacy 
of the British rule.  Indian economic history thus suggests that it is politics 
rather than law which determines economic design and outcomes (see further 
Singh 2008; see also Roe, 2002). 
 
Be that as it may, in summary this discussion together with the other relevant 
literature on law, finance and development, suggests that the two questions 
listed at the end of Section 1 are clearly among the central empirical 
propositions bearing on the validity of the LLSV theses.  
 
3.  Shareholder Protection Data 
 
The longitudinal data on 60 variables indicating in each case some aspect of 
shareholder protection have been assembled by the legal members of the CBR 
team for the period 1970-2005. This entailed a gigantic amount of hard work by 
the legal scholars.  It requires even greater further effort to push such legal time-
series back in time.  This is the reason why such data could only be collected for 
four advanced countries as well as a developing country, India, not considered 
in this essay.  In contrast, LLSV’s empirical analysis is based on an index of so-
called anti-director rights consisting only of 6 variables, namely proxy by mail; 
shares not blocked before meeting; cumulative voting/proportional 
representation; oppressed minority; pre-emptive rights to new issues; percentage 
share of capital to call a special meeting of shareholders. However, in mitigation 
it should be noted that the LLSV’s original data covered 49 developed and 
developing countries for a single cross-section year in the mid-1990s. 
 
LLSV accept the criticism that their collection of variables above is ad hoc and 
without any explicit theoretical foundations.  However more satisfactory 
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theoretical basis to LLSV’s original list is provided by the addition of anti self-
dealing variables, as in Djankov et al (2008). 
For the purposes of comparison with the LLSV variables, important 
characteristics of the CBR longitudinal data set may be summarised as follows: 
 
 It is based on ‘law on books’. 
 It takes into account company law, and some areas of securities 
law, although most parts of the latter are excluded. 
 Corporate governance codes are included as are case law and 
changes brought about by court decisions.  
 In the case of the US, the coding is based on Delaware Law. 
 Self-regulatory listing rules of the stock exchange are also taken 
into account and in the case of the UK, the City Code on takeover 
and mergers is included, although it is not statutory, but 
compliance is considered a rule. 
 
Significantly, the CBR longitudinal data set also takes into account the fact that 
the same function may be performed by different laws in different countries.  
Functional equivalence is an important concept in comparative corporate law.  
Regulatory takeover codes are generally thought to play a major role in 
underpinning minority shareholder rights and encouraging the dispersion of 
ownership in some common law systems, such as the UK and Australia, but this 
type of regulation is absent in the United States.  In the latter country certain 
specific rules of securities law, the law of fiduciary duties and a more 
permissive approach to shareholder-led litigation play a similar role (Armour 
and Skeel, 2007). 
 
Unlike the LLSV, which use only binary variables, the CBR data set has each of 
the variables taking a value between 0 and 1. An explanation of the variables 
included can be found in Annex 1.  Many take intermediate values, since it was 
considered inaccurate and in many cases impossible to describe the level of a 
certain type of protection simply with a binary variable.  A value of 1 relates to 
the highest level of protection and a 0 to the lowest; so if a country were to have 
the maximum level of shareholder protection, the indicators would sum up to 
60. There are two major categories of variables identified:  a) those protecting 
shareholders against management and board, and b) those protecting the 
shareholders against other shareholders. 
 
4. Preliminary results in terms of individual and aggregated variables 
 
 6
Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2008) reported the following main differences in 
shareholder protection on the basis of elementary analyses of individual 
variables. 
 Over the 36-year time span, there was a change in roughly a third of the 
60 variables in each country. 
 Countries protect differently – laws adapt to the circumstances of the 
country. 
 Of the 60 variable set, 42 represented shareholder protection against 
board and management and 18 indicated protection against other 
shareholders. 
 In many areas law does not change but these are not the same areas in 
each country. 
 In all four countries, changes in law have occurred in variables relating to 
corporate governance, such as board composition, directors’ 
compensation etc. 
 
However, it would be useful to aggregate the variables in order to make 
comparative statements about legal protection for shareholders in different 
countries. In line with much of the literature we use the un-weighted sum of all 
variables as an aggregated index of shareholder protection. This procedure thus 
assumes that all variables are equally important which is of course unlikely to 
be true but assigning unequal weights risks the exercise becoming too arbitrary. 
 
Some elementary but highly pertinent results, based on aggregated data are 
reported in Table 1. The table provides aggregate legal indices of shareholder 
protection from 1970-2005 in the three mother countries and the US, averaged 
over 7 consecutive 5-year periods. The table suggests that in 1970-74 the UK 
had the lowest protection and Germany had the highest.  Shareholders 
protection increased throughout the 36 year period in all countries. By 2000-05, 
the US had the lowest protection followed by Germany, then the UK and 
France.  
 
By averaging the indices of the two civil law countries, Germany and France 
and those of the two common law countries, the UK and US, it is observed that 
the two civil law countries always had a higher protection of shareholders than 
the common law countries for each of the seven 5-year periods (Figure 1). Mean 
comparison paired t-test strongly supports significantly lower shareholder 
protection in common law countries (Table 1). Replicating a series of the same 
type of  tests taking one country from each group (UK vs. France, USA vs. 
France, UK vs. Germany and USA vs. Germany) we could find no case of 
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higher shareholder protection in common law countries (results available on 
request).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Aggregate Legal Indices of Shareholder Protection, 1970-2005:  
‘Original Sin’ Countries 
                                                                                                      (Period averages) 
Period USA UK Common 
Law1 
Germany France Civil 
Law2 
1970-74 28.5 26.8 27.65 29.33 28.25 28.79 
1975-79 29.4 27.4 28.4 29.53 28.25 28.89 
1980-84 30 29.4 29.7 30.93 28.65 29.79 
1985-89 29.5 30.88 30.19 31.33 32.55 31.94 
1990-94 29.69 32.48 31.085 31.33 34.8 33.065 
1995-99 29.39 35.3 32.345 32.43 34.15 33.29 
2000-05 32.54 37 34.77 36.81 37.5 37.155 
Mean Comparison Paired t test 
     mean(difference) = mean (Common Law-Civil Law)                      t =  -4.0148 
 Ho: mean(difference) = 0                              degrees of freedom =        6 
Ha: mean(difference) < 0 
Reject Ho in favour of  Ha  at  0.01 % level of significance 
1 Average of USA and UK series 
2 Average of  Germany and France series 
 
Source: Lele and Siems (2007)       
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
These broad-brush results are all in conflict with the predictions of the Legal 
Origin model. Following Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2008), the same point 
may be illustrated in a slightly different way as follows:  If LLSV’s Legal 
Origin theory was valid, one would expect to see the following rank order of 
shareholder protection in the four countries:  UK (A), followed by or equal to 
the US (B, A), followed by Germany (C), followed by France (D), which may 
be summarised as the rank order ABCD or AACD.  What in fact we observe in 
different sub-periods since 1970 are nowhere near the LLSV predictions.  The 
outcome differs from the predicted sequence for shareholder protection for each 
of the 7 sub-periods in Table 1. 
 
 
5. Shareholders’ Protection and Stock Market Development 
 
As indicated earlier, an important part of LLSV thesis holds that countries with 
high shareholder protection will also have greater development of their financial 
sectors generally and, more specifically, their stock markets. This question was 
empirically examined in Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2008) by means of co-
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integration analysis and contrary to the received literature it indicated that there 
is no long-term relationship between shareholder protection and the 
development of the stock market. The conclusion was fine as far as it went but it 
was subject to some important reservations.  First, as mentioned in the 
introduction, it did not take into account the question of causality, nor did it 
consider the short-term dynamics of the relationship between the two variables 
and how it led to long-term equilibrium. 
 
Further the study considered only one indicator of stock market development – 
the turnover ratio (defined below). In the rest of this paper we provide analysis 
both of short term dynamics as well as long run equilibrium relationships for 
these three other indicators of stock market development (in addition to the 
turnover ratio). It will be interesting to see whether this more comprehensive 
exercise will sustain the Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2008) conclusions. 
 
The four indicators of stock market development used successively as variables 
on the left hand side of the equation in the following analysis are: 
 
LMKP is the value of  listed shares to GDP (in natural log); it is calculated 
using the following formula:  {(0.5)*[Ft/Pet + Ft-1 /Pet-1]}/[GDPt /Pat] where Ft is 
stock market capitalization, Pet  is the end-of period  consumer price index, CPI, 
and Pat  is average annual CPI in current period t. 
 
LVTRD is the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange to GDP 
(in natural log). 
 
LTURN is log of the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real 
market capitalization. This is calculated using the following method: 
Tt/Pat/{(0.5)*[Ft/Pet + Ft-1/Pet-1] where T is total value traded, F is stock market 
capitalization, Pe  is end-of period CPI,  Pa is average annual CPI. 
 
LLISTPOP is the number of listed firms per million of population (in natural 
log). 
 
Turning to the right hand side of the equation, first, as in Fagernas, Sarkar and 
Singh (2008) the level of economic activity in a country is represented by real 
GDP in purchasing power parity constant dollars, deflated by population. The 
shareholder protection variables also on the right hand side of the equation 
consist of (a) protection against board and management (SPRID) and (b) 
protection against minority shareholders against other shareholders (SPMIN). 5 
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The sources of the data of the above variables (excepting the shareholder 
protection data which are from CBR project already mentioned) are the 
Financial Structure Dataset (see Beck et al 2000) and the World Development 
Indicators, both from the World Bank.  Due to non-availability of data our 
period of analysis is 1976-2005 for three stock market variables, LMKP, 
LVTRD and LTURN and a shorter period 1980-2005 for LLISTPOP. 
 
 
5.1 Tests of Causality 
 
We first consider tests of causality. To understand whether the direction of 
causality is from shareholder protection (X) to stock market development (Y) or 
the opposite or both (mutual causation) we shall use VAR Granger causality test 
for each of four OECD countries over the period, 1976-2005 (1980-2005 for the 
data on stock market listing). In addition to the right-hand side variables 
outlined above we have also included intercept (c), trend (t) and dummies -
intercept and slope dummies for the dotcom bubble bursting during 2000-05 
(d2yk and sd2yk respectively).   
 
To understand whether Y (log of the four indicators of stock market 
developments chosen one at a time) is caused by X (two components of 
shareholder protection index chosen one at a time) through VAR (Vector-
Autoregressive)-Granger causality we have fitted a regression where Y is a 
function of its past values and past values of X and Z plus c, t, d2yk, sd2yk and 
tested whether the coefficients of the lags of X are jointly significant (different 
from zero) through Wald-test statistic. To test whether Y causes X we have 
fitted a regression where X is a function of its past values and past values of Y 
and Z plus c, t, d2yk, sd2yk and tested the joint significance of the coefficients 
of the lags of Y.  If the Wald test statistic is very high (higher than a critical 
value) in the first case then we can say that X causes Y; if in both cases these 
statistics are significant we can say that the two variables are related in mutual 
causation. 
 
Similarly we can test whether Z causes Y or X or there is a reverse or mutual 
causation.  We have chosen the optimum lag (how many years past are to be 
considered) as the maximum of the lags determined by a number of criteria such 
as Schwarz Bayesian Criterion.  
 
This VAR causality test (Table 2) shows that by and large shareholder 
protection does not influence (Granger-cause) stock market development. There 
are some remarkable exceptions: in Germany shareholder protection relating to 
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board (SPBRD) Granger-causes the value of stock trade (LVTRD) and turnover 
(LTURN); in the USA minority shareholder protection (SPMIN) influences 
stock market listing (LLIST). 
 
There is some evidence of reverse causation. In France stock market 
development (as indicated by value of stock trade, LVTRD and stock market 
listing, LLISTPOP) Granger-causes shareholder protection relating to board, 
and market capitalization Granger-causes minority shareholder protection 
(popularly known as investor protection). Value of stock trading (LVTRD) in 
UK, turnover ratio (LTURN) in Germany and stock market listing (LLISTPOP) 
in the USA Granger-causes minority shareholder protection 
 
From the above findings it follows that in the USA stock market listing and 
minority shareholder protection are connected in a relationship of mutual 
causation. This stock market listing is also in a mutual causal relationship with 
US GDP per capita. These two relationships are not enough to establish a 
significant relationship between minority shareholder protection and GDP per 
capita. 
 
In Germany also stock market development as indicated by value of stock 
trading and turnover ratio and GDP per capita are linked through a mutual 
causal relationship. No such link between financial sector and real sector exists 
in France and the UK. 
 
Lastly, in both France and Germany shareholder protection relating to board is 
influenced by GDP per capita. No such connection can be found in the USA and 
UK. 
 
Overall, the Granger causality results indicate that patterns of causation differ 
between countries and in any case it is clearly unwise to generalise on the basis 
of information from only four countries. 
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Table 2. Relationships among Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development Indicators 
and Real GDP per capita for Four OECD Countries, 1976-2005: VAR Granger Causality 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
France 
 
Germany 
 
UK 
 
USA 
 
Market 
Capitalisation –
log  (LMKP) 
     
 SP-board 4.86 6.51 4.14 1.55 
 SP-minority 2.73 10.39 9.41 2.81 
 LPPPCY 3.06 9.6 5.42 1.02 
Value of Trade –
log (LVTRD) 
     
 SP-board 4.91 12.41* 4.39 8.64 
 SP-minority 9.63 2.71 6.31 2.49 
 LPPPCY 6.79 15.85* 6.76 4.91 
Turnover Ratio-  
log (TURN) 
     
 SP-board 5.97 16.15* 8.32 1.26 
 SP-minority 2.28 3.84 6.82 4.54 
 LPPPCY 3.98 17.05* 6.28 9.15 
Listed Firms –
log(LLISTPOP) 
     
 SP-board 0.81 1.86 1.76 6.31 
 SP-minority 7.09 2.81 2.97 24.99* 
 LPPPCY 4.02 7.08 1.31 16.22* 
Shareholder 
Protection Index 
relating to Board 
(SP-board) 
     
 LMKP 0.89 5.67 9.16 7.05 
 LVTRD 17.66* 6.76 4.99 2.89 
 LTURN 4.04 4.87 5.37 3.21 
 LLISTPOP 59.78* 1.65 2.61 2.02 
 LPPPCY 41.55* 11.2* 9.58 5.51 
Shareholder 
Protection Index 
relating to 
Minority (SP-
minority) 
     
 LMKP 12.97* 1.23 4.83 5.67 
 LVTRD 9.16 9.44 12.61* 5.69 
 LTURN 3.79 12.15* 10.62 5.88 
 LLISTPOP 7.41 0.66 1.53 14.78* 
 LPPPCY 11.4 1.11 6.83 9 
GDP per capita-
log 
(LPPPCY) 
     
 LMKP 1.96 24.43* 3.75 2.88 
 LVTRD 3.21 68.48* 5.04 5.86 
 LTURN 5.51 23.01* 4.31 5.91 
 LLISTPOP 9.27 6.22 0.26 25.51* 
 SP-board 1.85 0.88 2.81 5.08 
 SP-minority 7.43 3.65 1.24 5.14 
* No causality null hypothesis rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance 
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5.2 Estimates of Short run and Long-run Relationships 
 
To understand the nature of the relationships observed via VAR-Granger 
causality we shall use the Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) approach to 
co-integration developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). This technique helps us to 
estimate a short-term relationship and its adjustment dynamics (error-correction 
mechanism) leading to a long-term relationship. The ARDL approach 
accommodates both stationary and non-stationary variables. 6  
 
The following ARDL (p, q, r) equation was fitted: 
 
(1) kt
r
k
kjt
q
j
jit
p
i
it ZYXtX 





 
001
       
 
where  is the intercept,  is the coefficient of time, t, X is the dependent 
variable, Y and Z represent independent variables. Subscripts t, t-i, t-j, t-k (i 
=1,2,3..p,  j = 1,2,3..q and k = 1,2,3,..  r) indicate different time periods and p, q 
and r are the lags to be determined. If needed we have added intercept and slope 
dummies for dotcom bubble bursting (dy2k and sdy2k). 
 
There are many criteria of choosing the lag-structure and we have used Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC), recommended by Pesaran and Shin (1999). Using 
Microfit programme we have estimated the parameters of equation (1), its error 
correction form and the long-run relationships. In one case the chosen model is 
ARDL (0, 0, 0) implying no short-run dynamics– there is no difference between 
long run and short-run relationships. For the sake of brevity we have skipped 
the estimates of error correction models but we have reported the significance of 
ecm (-1) – its negativity along with statistical significance implies the stability 
of the short-term dynamics leading to a convergence towards the long run 
relationship (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Short-run and Long-run Relationships between Stock Market Development 
Indicator and Shareholder Protection Indices, 1976-2005 
 
 
Country & 
Dependent 
Variables 
(ARDL 
Model) 
Independent 
Variables 
Short Run 
Coefficients 
Long Run 
Coefficients 
GERMANY    
SPBRD    
(0,0) LPPPCY -0.24 -0.24 
 C 2.82* 2.82* 
 T 0.01* 0.01* 
 DY2K -0.36** -0.36** 
 SDY2K 0.02** 0.02** 
LVTRD    
(2,3,0) LVTRD (-1) 0.29  
 LVTRD (-2) 0.67  
 SPBRD -2.09 890.23 
 SPBRD (-1) 5.19  
 SPBRD (-2) 9.42**  
 SPBRD (-3) 12.49**  
 LPPPCY -16.19** -572.08 
 C 144.13** 5128.9 
 T 0.29** 10.28 
 DY2K 18.86** 671.28 
 SDY2K -0.75** -26.99 
 ecm (-1) -0.03  
LTURN    
(2, 5, 5) LTURN (-1) 0.16  
 LTURN (-2) 0.35  
 SPBRD -1.77 81.53 
 SPBRD (-1) -4.38  
 SPBRD (-2) 0.48  
 SPBRD (-3) 10.49*  
 SPBRD (-4) 18.12  
 SPBRD (-5) 16.89  
 LPPPCY -10.34 -16.16 
 LPPPCY (-1) 6.22  
 LPPPCY (-2) -8.17  
 LPPPCY (-3) -4.82  
 LPPPCY (-4) 18.23*  
 LPPPCY (-5) -9.01  
 C 57.35 177.37 
 T 0.08 0.16 
 DY2K 12.76* 26.11 
 SDY2K -0.47 -0.96 
 ecm (-1) -0.49  
LPPPCY    
(2,5) LPPPCY (-1) -0.53**  
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 LPPPCY (-2) -0.65**  
 LVTRD -0.01** 6.66** 
 LVTRD (-1) 0.01*  
 LVTRD (-2) 0.01  
 LVTRD (-3) 0.01  
 LVTRD (-4) 0.01  
 LVTRD (-5) 0.01*  
 C 10.89** 458.53 
 T 0.02** 22.03** 
 DY2K 0.39** 8.09** 
 SDY2K -0.02** -8.46** 
 ecm (-1) -1.12**  
SPMIN    
(1,5) SPMIN (-1) 0.43  
 LTURN 0.001 -0.05** 
 LTURN (-1) -0.02*  
 LTURN (-2) 0.002  
 LTURN (-3) 0.01  
 LTURN (-4) -0.004  
 LTURN (-5) -0.02**  
 C 0.25** 0.44** 
 T 0.004** 0.01** 
 ecm (-1) -0.57**  
USA    
LLIST    
(0,4) LPPPCY -24.68 -147.75** 
 LPPPCY (-1) -6.88  
 LPPPCY (-2) -34.55  
 LPPPCY (-3) -42.87  
 LPPPCY (-4) -38.77*  
 C 1491.9** 1491.9** 
 T 2.76** 2.76** 
 DY2K 42.59** 42.59** 
 SDY2K -1.78** -1.78** 
 ecm (-1) -1**  
LLIST    
(3,4) LLIST (-1) 0.82**  
 LLIST (-2) -0.07  
 LLIST (-3) -0.49  
 SPMIN  -12.34 100.81 
 SPMIN (-1) 49.33**  
 SPMIN (-2) -27.42  
 SPMIN (-3)  -12.01  
 SPMIN (-4) 77.12**  
 C -22.63 -30.55 
 T 0.48 0.65 
 DY2K 48.93** 66.07** 
 SDY2K -1.97* -2.65* 
 ecm (-1) -0.74**  
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France 
   
SPBRD    
(3,4,2) SPBRD (-1) 0.72**  
 SPBRD (-2) 0.68**  
 SPBRD (-3) -1**  
 LVTRD -0.01 0.02 
 LVTRD (-1) 0.0005  
 LVTRD (-2) 0.01*  
 LVTRD (-3) -0.02*  
 LVTRD (-4) 0.01  
 LPPPCY 0.14 0.62** 
 LPPPCY (-1) -0.42*  
 LPPPCY (-2) 0.65**  
 C -3.29** -5.47** 
 T -0.001** -0.01** 
 ecm (-1) -0.6**  
* Significant at 10 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 per cent level. 
 
Notes:   
The following ARDL (p, q, r) equation was fitted: 
 
(1) kt
r
k
kjt
q
j
jit
p
i
it ZYXtX 





 
001
       
 
where  is the intercept,  is the coefficient of time, t, X is the dependent variable, Y and Z 
represent independent variables. Subscripts t, t-i, t-j, t-k (i =1,2,3..p,  j = 1,2,3..q and k = 
1,2,3,..  r) indicate different time periods and p, q and r are the lags to be determined. We 
have retained the time trend in the ARDL equation only if the coefficient of t is found 
significant in equation (1).  If needed we have added intercept and slope dummies for dotcom 
bubble bursting (dy2k and sdy2k). 
 
The optimum lag structure (p,q,r) is chosen on the basis of  Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
(SBC). 
 
 
First we examine the nature of various causal relationships in Germany (found 
above through Granger causality tests). The ARDL procedure shows that the 
short-run and long run relationship between shareholder protection relating to 
board (SPBRD) and real GDP per capita (LPPPCY) is insignificant. So to 
examine the relationship between shareholder protection and stock market 
development we have retained the LPPPCY in the ARDL equation. It is 
observed that the influence of shareholder protection relating to board (SPBRD) 
on the value of stock trading (LVTRD) and turnover ratio (LTURN) is positive 
in the short run (as one lag term is significant in each case) but non-existent in 
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the long-run (without any significant adjustment path from the short run to long 
run). There is however some trace of reverse causation: minority shareholder 
protection (SPMIN) is negatively influenced by stock market turnover 
(LTURN). The influence of LPPPCY on LVTRD and LTURN is significant in 
the short run but not significant in the long run. It could be verified by fitting 
the ARDL equations without SPBRD (details are skipped). However the 
favourable influence of stock market development (as indicated by LVTRD and 
LTURN) on the real sector (as indicated by real GDP per capita, LPPPCY) is 
valid in both short run and long run; there exists also a stable adjustment path 
towards the long-run equilibrium (we have skipped the estimates of the equation 
concerning LPPPCY and LTURN to save space).  
 
Next we examine US cases. Examining the mutual causation between stock 
market listing (LLIST) and per capita GDP (LPPPCY) we find a significant 
negative (!) short-run and long run influence of LPPPCY on LLIST. On the 
contrary there is short run favourable influence of LLIST on LPPCY but no 
long run influence (details are skipped).  If we include LPPPCY in the ARDL 
equation we could observe significant negative short run and long run both way 
relationship between LLIST and SPMIN (details are skipped). Otherwise we 
could find significant positive short run influence of SPMIN on LLIST but no 
long-run impact. There is however neither short run nor long run reverse 
relationship from LLIST to SPMIN (details are skipped). 
 
In France the short run influence of stock market development (as indicated by 
LVTRD and LLIST) and LPPPCY on SPBRD is complex (in some years we 
find positive and in some years negative influence). In the long run only the 
favourable impact of LPPPCY prevails (in Table 3 we have reported the 
estimates of one ARDL equation to save space). Similar is the story for the 
relationship between SPMIN and LMKP in France and SPMIN and LVTRD in 
UK (details are skipped).  
 
To sum up, shareholder protection has, generally speaking, no long run 
influence on different stock market variables such as market capitalization, 
value of trade or stock market listing. In Germany shareholder protection 
relating to board has somewhat favourable short run influence on the value of 
stock trading. Similarly minority shareholder protection has a favourable short 
run influence on US stock market listing. There is some trace of reverse 
causation in Germany and that is negative: minority shareholder protection 
declines as turnover ratio soars high.  In France and UK a complex short run 
influence (no clear causal direction) of stock market on shareholder protection 
exists. 
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Only in Germany real economic activities (as measured by real GDP per capita, 
LPPPCY) get some favourable feedback from stock market activities but the 
opposite is true only in the short run.  In the USA stock market activities as 
measured by stock market listing exert favourable short run effect on the real 
sector but the real sector exerts a perverse effect on stock market so far as stock 
market listing is concerned. 
 
 
6. Conclusion   
 
The foregoing analyses lead to two rather different kinds of conclusions. The 
first are the narrow technical findings concerning whether the more 
comprehensive econometric analysis of the present paper supports the results of 
Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2008). The answer is an unqualified ‘yes’. Thus by 
the same token, the LLSV propositions concerning legal origin, shareholder 
protection and stock market development are not sustained by the analyses of 
the longitudinal data employed in this paper.  This raises an important question 
– why do our results differ from those of the received literature?  There are two 
hypotheses which are relevant in this context.  First the divergence could be due 
to the differences in the data sets used in this study and those employed in 
LLSV-type studies.  The second hypothesis points to the differences in cross-
sectional and time series analyses.  The task of establishing the validity or 
otherwise of these hypotheses is one which requires a paper in its own right and 
will not be attempted here.  All that can be said here is that it is not surprising 
that cross-sectional results (particularly LLSV type results based on one or two 
years of observation per country) should differ from those provided by time 
series analysis.  A well known example is that of education and democracy.  On 
a cross-sectional basis the two variables are found to be highly correlated, 
however, time series analysis shows no relation between the variables. On the 
first hypothesis it is worth observing that the data used in this paper is much 
more comprehensive and thoroughly grounded in comparative legal theory, 
which is in striking contrast to the ad hoc collection of variables used 
particularly in the earlier LLSV type studies. 
 
The second type of conclusion which follows from the above analysis concerns 
policy.  The results of the studies carried out by LLSV and their collaborators 
have been used by organisations such as the World Bank to suggest that 
developing countries should reform their laws to adopt the common law, and to 
follow Anglo-Saxon model of finance to foster economic development.  The 
norm of shareholder wealth maximisation subject to the constraints of liquid 
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stock markets has been propagated as a universal standard.  The empirical 
findings of this paper, however, cast serious doubt on the validity of the basic 
theses of the Anglo Saxon legal and developmental model. This evidence is 
more compatible with the ‘varieties of capitalism thesis’, which suggests that 
each country has its own form of capitalism and its own legal and regulatory 
institutions, and that there is no single development model which can cover all 
their needs (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  The World Bank’s enthusiasm for the 
Anglo-Saxon model of law, finance and development as the basis for socio and 
economic policy is to say the least premature. 
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Notes 
 
1 For an analysis of Indian shareholder protection scenario see Sarkar (2007). 
2  For a recent review article of the literature on the subject and for a spirited 
defence of their various positions against all critics see La Porta et al (2008). 
This article contains a full list of references to the relevant literature. 
3 In addition to the references above to the works of LLSV and La Porta et al 
(2008) see also Pagano and Volpin (2006) and Pistor et al (2003). 
4 See further: La Porta et al (2008); Rajan and Zingales (1998); Beck et al 
(2003); Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2005); Beck and Levine (2005); Perotei and 
Volpin (2004); Guiso et al (2004). 
5 The two sub-categories are described below: 
Under the first sub-aggregate, protection against board and management, the 
following headings are listed:  powers of the general meeting (indicated by 
variables 1 to 7 in the full list given in Annex and so on for the other headings); 
agenda setting power (8 to 10); extraordinary shareholder meeting (11 to 12); 
anticipation of shareholder decision (13 to 15); information in the run-up of the 
general meeting (16 and 17); shares not blocked before general meeting (18); 
individual information rights (19 and 20); communication with other 
shareholders (21 and 22);  board composition (23 to 25); no excessive 
remuneration for non-executive and executive directors (26 to 28); performance 
based remuneration (29); duration of director’s appointment (30 and 31); 
directors duties (32 to 34); shareholder supremacy (35 and 36); pre-emptive 
rights (37); director’s disqualification (38); corporate governance code (39); and 
public enforcement of company law (40 to 42).  
Under sub-aggregate, protection against other shareholders, the following 
headings and the corresponding variable numbers are listed:  quorum (43); 
supermajority requirements (44); one share – one vote (45 to 47); cumulative 
voting (48); voting by interested shareholders prohibited (49); no squeeze out 
(freeze out) (50); right to exit (51 to 53); disclosure of major share ownership 
(54); oppressed minority (55 and 56); and shareholder protection is mandatory 
(57 to 60). 
6 It requires the variables to be I (0) or I (1) or fractionally integrated. None of 
our variables are I(k) where k >1. 
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Annex: Indices 
Shareholder protection index: 60 variables 
 
Variables 
 
Description1 
Part 1:  
Protection 
against board 
and 
management 
 
 
1. Powers of the 
general meeting2 
 
The following variables equal 0 if there is no power of the general meeting 
and 1 if there is a power of the general meeting.. 
(1) Amendments of articles of association 
(2) Mergers and divisions 
(3) Capital measures3 
(4) De facto changes: The decisive thresholds are the sale of 
substantial assets of the company (e.g., if the sale of more than 50 
% requires approval of the general meeting it equals 1; if more than 
80 %, it equals 0.5; and otherwise 0). 
(5) Dividend distributions: Equals 1 if the general meeting can 
effectively influence the amount of dividend (e.g., if it decides about 
the annual accounts and the annual dividend, and if the board has 
no significant possibility of ‘manipulating’ the accounts); equals 0.5 
if there is some participation of the general meeting; equals 0 if it is 
only the board that decides about the dividend. 
(6) Election of board of directors 
(7) Directors’ self-dealing of substantial transactions 
 
2. Agenda setting 
power 
 
 
(8) General topics: Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % or less of the 
capital can put an item on the agenda; equals 0.5 if there is a 
hurdle of more than 1 % but less than 10 %; equals 0 otherwise. 
(9) Election of directors: ditto 
(10) Costs: Equals 1 if shareholders do not have to pay for their 
proposals; equals 0 otherwise. 
 
3. Extraordinary 
shareholder 
meeting 
(11) Right: Equals 1 if the minimum percentage of share capital to 
demand an extraordinary meeting is less than or equal to 5 %; 
equals 0.5 if it is more than 5 % but less or equal than 10 %; equals 
0 otherwise. 
(12) Enforcement: Equals 1 if shareholders can call the meeting 
themselves or have a right that the court will enforce it; equals 0 if 
the court has discretion. 
 
 
4. Anticipation of 
shareholder 
decision 
(13) Restrictions on proxy voting: Equals 0 if there are restrictions on 
who can be appointed or which rights the proxy has so that it is 
likely that proxy voting does usually not take place; equals 0.5 if 
                                                 
1 Even where the description of the variables does not mention so specifically, we have given intermediate 
scores wherever necessary. 
2 For the power of the general meeting for remuneration see variable 26. 
3 The possibility of authorised capital does not lead to a reduction from 1 to 0.5 because the default rule does not 
change. 
 24
there are some restrictions which reduce the relevance of proxy 
voting; equals 1 if there are no restrictions. 
(14) Anticipation facilitated: Equals 1 if postal voting or proxy solicitation 
with two-way voting proxy form has to be provided by the company; 
equals 0.5 if two-way proxy form has to be provided but not proxy 
solicitation; equals 0 otherwise. 
(15) Costs of proxy contest: Equals 1 if the costs of proxy solicitations 
are paid by the company or if proxies have the right to have their 
proposals included in the company’s proxy form; equals 0 
otherwise. 
 
5. Information in 
the run-up of the 
general meeting 
(16) Amendments of the articles of association: Equals 1 if the exact 
wording has to be sent in advance (‘push-system’); equals 0.5 if the 
shareholders have to request it (‘pull-system’); equals 0 otherwise.  
(17) Mergers: Equals 1 if a special report has to be sent in advance 
(‘push-system’); equals 0.5 if the shareholders have to request it 
(‘pull-system’); equals 0 otherwise.  
 
6. Shares not 
blocked before 
general meeting 
(18) Equals 0 if shareholders have to deposit their shares prior to the 
general meeting and if this has the consequence that shareholders are 
prevented from selling their shares for a number of days; equals 1 
otherwise.  
 
7. Individual 
information rights 
(19) Right to demand information (1): equals 1 if an individual 
shareholder or shareholders with 5 % or less capital can demand 
information which will be answered at the general meeting; equals 
0.5 if shareholders with 10% or less capital have this right; equals 0 
otherwise. 
(20) Right to demand information (2): equals 1 if an individual 
shareholder or shareholders with 5 % or less capital can demand 
information independent of the general meeting; equals 0.5 if 
shareholders with 10% or less capital have this right; equals 0 
otherwise. 
 
8. Communication 
with other 
shareholders 
(21) Right to access the register of shareholders and (if necessary) 
beneficial owners: Equals 1 if the right of inspection can be used by 
a single shareholder; equals 0 if there is no such right. 
(22) Equals 1 if communication is not affected by proxy rules; equals 0 
otherwise. 
 
9. Board 
composition 
 
(23) Division between management and control: Equals 1 if there is a 
two-tier system or at least half of the board members are non-
executive; equals 0.5 if at least 25% of the board members are non-
executive; equals 0 otherwise.  
(24) Independent board members:4 Equals 1 if at least half of the board 
members must be independent; equals 0.5 if at least 25 % of them 
must be independent or if the independence requirement is very 
low; equals 0 otherwise. 
(25) Committees: Equals 1 if companies have to install an audit and a 
remuneration committee with a majority of independent members; 
intermediate scores are possible if the requirement is partial, (for 
instance requires setting up of one of the committees or the 
independent members of the committees constitute less than a 
                                                 
4 To be sure, independent board members may also be a method to protect minority shareholders against 
majority shareholders. This depends, however, on the definition of ‘independence’, which is not coded in this 
variable. 
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majority); equals 0 if committees are not necessary or if they are 
not required to have independent members.  
 
10.No excessive 
remuneration for 
non-executive and 
executive  
directors 
(26) General meeting power:5 Equals 1 if the general meeting has to 
approve all compensation schemes; equals 0.5 if this is limited 
(e.g., applies to stock option plans only, or if some directors are 
excluded); equals 0 otherwise. 
(27) Annual disclosure: Equals 1 if there is full and specific disclosure 
about the individual remuneration of each director; equals 0.75 if 
there is information about the individual remuneration of some 
directors; equals 0.5 if there is disclosure about the top 2 directors 
(executives); equals 0.25 if there is only disclosure about the overall 
remuneration; equals 0 otherwise. 
(28) Substantive requirements placing limit for remuneration in order to 
protect shareholders: Equals 1 if there is a direct regulation; equals 
0 otherwise 
 
11. Performance 
based 
remuneration 
(29) Equals 1 if performance based remuneration of directors and 
managers is fostered (e.g. facilitation of stock options to reward 
performance); equals 0 otherwise.  
 
12. Duration of 
director’s 
appointment 
(30) Normal duration: Equals 1 if this is one year or less; 0 if this is five 
years or more; equals 0.5 if this is more than 1 but less than 5 
years . 
(31) Dismissal feasible: Equals 1 if there are no special requirements; 
equals 0 if an important or good reason is required; intermediate 
scores are possible if there are no special requirements but there 
may be financial burden for the company (e.g. in the form of 
compensation under a statute or contract or damages for breach of 
contract or salary under a fixed term contract). 
 
13. Directors 
duties6 
 
(32) Directors’ liability - duty of care: Equals 0 if there are narrow criteria 
which virtually exclude liability; equals 0.5 if there are some 
restrictions (e.g., business judgement rule; gross negligence); 
equals 1 if there are no or little restrictions regarding business 
judgement and standard of care.  
(33) Directors’ liability - duty of loyalty: Equals 1 if there is a duty not to 
put personal interests ahead of the company; equals 0 otherwise.  
(34) Private enforcement: Equals 0 if this is typically excluded (e.g., 
because of strict subsidiarity requirement, hurdle which is at least 
10 %; cost rules); equals 0.5 if there are some restrictions [e.g., 
certain percentage of share capital (unless the hurdle is at least 10 
%); cost rules; demand requirement]; equals 1 otherwise. 
 
14. Shareholder 
supremacy 
(35) General principle: Equals 1 if the board always has to give priority 
to shareholders interests; equals 0 if the board have to give priority 
to the interests of other stakeholders; equals 0.5 in other cases. 
(36) Takeover law: Equals 1 if there is the principle of strict neutrality in 
case of takeovers; equals 0.5 if the principle of neutrality is subject 
to exceptions; equals 0 otherwise.7  
 
                                                 
5 For the involvement of boards and committees see generally variables 23-25. 
6 For approval of directors’ conduct by the general meeting, the supervisory board, or independent board 
members see variables 1-7, 23-25. For exclusion of liability in the articles see variable 57. 
7 For preventive measures see, e.g. variables 45-47. 
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15. Pre-emptive 
right 
(37) Equals 1 when the law grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy 
new issues of shares, and this right can be waived only by the general 
meeting;8 equals 0 otherwise. 
 
16. Director’s 
disqualification 
(38) Equals 1 if negligent conduct can lead to disqualification; 0.5 if 
directors are disqualified only in specific instances of negligence (e.g., 
failure of financial reporting); equals 0 if negligent conduct itself is not 
sufficient for disqualification 
 
17. Corporate 
governance code 
 
(39) Equals 1 if companies have to disclose and explain whether they 
comply with a corporate governance code; equals 0.5 if this is only 
recommended; equals 0 otherwise.  
 
18. Public 
enforcement of 
company law 
The following variables equal 0 if there is no power of public authority and 1 
if public authority has power. 
(40) Authorisation for director’s self dealing of substantial transactions 
(41) Authorisation for appointment of managers 
(42) Power to intervene in cases of prejudice to public interest or interest 
of the company for instance due to ‘mismanagement of company’ 
or in cases of oppression of shareholders  
 
 
Part 2: 
Protection 
against other 
shareholder 
 
 
1. Quorum (43) Equals 1 if there is a 50 % quorum for the extraordinary shareholder 
meeting (when it is called for the first time); equals 0.5 if the quorum is 1/3; 
equals 1/4 if the quorum is 1/4. Equals 0 otherwise. 
 
2. Supermajority 
requirements  
(44) Equals 1 if there are supermajority requirements (e.g., 2/3 or 3/4) for 
amendments of the articles of association, mergers, and voluntary 
liquidations; equals 0 if they do not exist at all. 
 
3. One share – 
one vote9 
 
(45) Default rule: Equals 1 if this principle exists as a default rule; equals 
0 otherwise. 
(46) Prohibition of multiple voting rights (super voting rights): Equals 1 if 
there is a prohibition; equals 2/3 if only companies which already 
have multiple voting rights can keep them; equals 1/3 if state 
approval is necessary; equals 0 otherwise. 
(47) Prohibition of capped voting rights (voting right ceilings): Equals 1 if 
there is a prohibition; equals 2/3 if only companies which already 
have voting caps can keep them; equals 1/3 if state approval is 
necessary; equals 0 otherwise. 
  
4. Cumulative 
voting 
(48) Equals 1 if shareholders can cast all their votes for one candidate 
standing for election to the board of directors or if there exists a mechanism 
of proportional representation in the board by which minority interests may 
name a proportional number of directors to the board (default or mandatory 
law); equals 0 otherwise. 
 
5. Voting by (49) Equals 1 if a shareholder cannot vote if this vote favours him or her 
                                                 
8 For the requirements for a waiver (e.g. supermajority, good reason) see variables 44, 55, 56. 
9 Preference shares without voting rights are not addressed because they are feasible in all countries. 
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interested 
shareholders 
prohibited 
 
personally (i.e., only ‘disinterested shareholders’ can vote); equals 0 
otherwise.  
6. No squeeze out 
(freeze out) 
 
(50) Equals 0 if a shareholder holding 90 % or more can ‘squeeze out’ the 
minority; equals 1 otherwise. 
7. Right to exit (51) Appraisal rights: Equals 1 if they exist for mergers, amendments of 
the articles and sales of major company assets; equals 0 if they do 
not exist at all. 
(52) Mandatory bid: Equals 1 if there is a mandatory bid for the entirety 
of shares in case of purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0 
if there is no mandatory bid at all. 
(53) Mandatory public offer: Equals 1 if there is a mandatory public offer 
for purchase of 10% or less of the shares; equals 0.5 if the acquirer 
has to make a mandatory public offer for acquiring more than 10% 
but less than 30 % of the shares; equals 0 otherwise. 
 
8. Disclosure of 
major share 
ownership 
 
(54) Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the companies 
capital have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 5 % of the capital; 
equals 0.5 if this concerns 10 %; equals 0.25 if this concerns 25 %; equals 0 
otherwise  
9. Oppressed 
minority 
(55) Substantive law: Equals 0 if majority decisions of the general 
meeting have to be accepted by the outvoted minority; equals 1 if 
some kind of substantive control is possible (e.g., in cases of 
amendments to the articles of association, ratification of 
management misconduct, exclusion of the pre-emption right, related 
parties transactions, freeze outs); equals 0.5 if this control covers 
only flagrant abuses of majority power. 
(56) Shareholder action: Equals 1 if every shareholder can file a claim 
against a resolution by the general meeting because he or she 
regards it as void or voidable; equals 0.5 if there are hurdles such as 
a threshold of at least 10 % voting rights or cost rules; equals 0 if 
this kind of shareholder action does not exist. 
 
10. Shareholder 
Protection is 
mandatory10 
 
(57) Exclusion of directors duty of care (see variable 32) in articles: 
equals 0 if possible and equals 1 otherwise. 
(58) Rules on duration of director’s appointment (see variables 30 and 
31): equals 1 if mandatory and 0 otherwise. 
(59) Board composition (supervisory boards, non-executive directors) 
(see variables 23 and 24): equals 1 if mandatory and 0 otherwise. 
(60) Other topics: equals 1 if there is the general rule that company law 
is mandatory; equals 0 if company law is in general just a ‘model off 
the shelf’; equals 0.5 if there is no general rule. 
 
 
 
Source: Lele and Siems, 2007.  
                                                 
10 Note: Variables 57-59 do not code the content of the law (this is already done in variables 23, 24, 30, 31, 32) 
but only its nature, i.e. whether ‘mandatory’ or ‘default’. 
